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Let L-410 veers off airstrip during takeoff at Ulang, South Sudan
18 May 2020
FAA extends security warnings for Kenya and Mali airspaces
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued two new Notams, extending the security warnings for the Kenya and Mali airspaces by another year.
FAA further extends allowed operations in Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman airspace
The U.S. FAA allowed U.S. flights to resume in the overwater airspace above the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, starting February 14. The new Notam however, does warn to exercise caution and to avoid operating on air routes nearest to the Tehran FIR (OIIX) boundary whenever possible. The situation in the region “remains fluid and could quickly escalate if circumstances change”, according to the FAA.
More information:
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- Notam KICZ A0014/20 (PDF)
EASA updated its recommendations of overflights of Iran and Iraq
EASA has re-evaluated their recommendations on flying over Iran and Iraq.
The Integrated EU Aviation Security Risk Assessment Group met on 28 January 2020 to assess the most recent information related to the safety and security of commercial air transport over Iran and Iraq. As an outcome of this meeting, the temporary recommendations issued by EASA and the EC Commission on 8 January 2020, recommending avoidance of all overflights of Iraq as a precautionary measure, and on 1 January 2020, recommending avoidance of all overflights of Iran as a precautionary measure, have been withdrawn.
On the basis of the latest information, the Group reaffirmed the position stated in the current published Conflict Zone Information Bulletins (CZIB) for overflights of Iran and Iraq airspace. CZIB-2017-04R5 for Iraq advises airlines to avoid overflights of Iraq except in two specific air corridors. CZIB-2020-01R0 for Iran advises against overflights of Iran at levels below 25,000 feet.
FAA further extends allowed operations in Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman airspace
The U.S. FAA has extended the allowed operations in Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman airspace, following a flight ban issued on January 8 and updated on January 10 and January 16.
Kuwait was added to the list of airports to/from which U.S. aircraft are allowed to operate. Additionally, operations may be conducted into and out of following airports in Saudi Arabia for which arrivals and departures may necessitate operations in the overwater airspace above the Persian Gulf: Ras Mishab (OERM), Jubail (OEJB), Dammam-King Fahd International (OEDF), Al Ahsa (OEAH), Batha (OEBT), Tanajib (OETN), And Ras Tanura (OERT).
Operations in restricted military areas established by Saudi Arabia, and arriving/departing from the above airports, with clearance from the appropriate authorities of Saudi Arabia are also allowed.
More information:
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- Notam KICZ A0012/20 (PDF)
ATSB: A330 and B737-800 came within 800 m during takeoff and go around at Sydney Airport
A330 and 737 flight paths and indication of the area of minimum separation (ATSB)
The design of standard instrument approaches and departures, air traffic control and flight crew actions and procedures, and the coding of aircraft flight management system navigation databases are among a number of the factors the ATSB is focusing on as part of the on-going investigation into a loss of separation event near Sydney Airport.
That investigation’s preliminary report, details that separation between two Qantas aircraft, an Airbus A330-300 and a Boeing 737-800, was reduced to about 0.43 nautical miles (796 metres) laterally and about 500 feet (152 metres) vertically during the incident, which occurred at around 18:30 hours local time on 5 August 2019.
The A330 had been cleared by air traffic control to take-off from Sydney Airport’s runway 34 Right, at the same time that the 737 was on final approach to land on the same runway. While the A330 was commencing its takeoff run, the air traffic controller with responsibility for managing runway 34 Right, an otherwise experienced controller who was a trainee under supervision for the Aerodrome Controller – East (ADC-E) position, assessed that if the 737 continued to land, there would be insufficient runway spacing between the two aircraft, and so instructed the 737 to conduct a go around.
The preliminary report details that the loss of separation occurred as both aircraft turned to the right, with the A330 turning to the right following a standard instrument departure (SID) from runway 34R (the MARUB 6 SID) and the 737 turning to the right following the missed approach procedure for a GLS (a global navigation satellite system landing system) approach for a landing on runway 34R.
The ADC-E controller, who reported that he had both aircraft in sight, attempted to increase their separation by instructing the 737 to turn further right. As both aircraft converged, the A330 flight crew received a traffic advisory (TA) alert from their aircraft’s airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS). The A330 first officer, who was pilot flying, then saw the 737 in close proximity and, in response, reduced the aircraft’s angle of bank to reduce the turn towards the 737. The captain of the A330 radioed to advise the ADC-E controller that their proximity to the 737 was “very close”. The controller then issued an instruction to the A330 flight crew to turn left.
The A330 climbed to 5,000 feet and continued to Melbourne without further incident. The 737 climbed to 3,000 feet and was issued radar vectors for a second approach to runway 34R. It landed without further incident a short time later.
The investigation is ongoing.
EASA recommends flights over Iran be avoided below FL250
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a Conflict Zone Information Bulletin recommending that flights over Iran be avoided at levels lower than 25,000 feet.
The Bulletin is valid until 16 July 2020 and reflects the conclusions of the EU Integrated Aviation Security Risk Assessment Group, which comprises EASA, the European Commission, European External Action Service and the EU Member States.
It states: “Due to the hazardous security situation, and poor coordination between civil aviation and military operations, there is a risk of misidentification of civil aircraft. Due to the presence of advanced air-defence systems, it is advised to be cautious with the risk associated to civil aviation. The risk to operations is assessed to be HIGH for Flight Levels below 250.”
As the situation in Iran is currently very dynamic, a more restrictive recommendation, issued on 11/01/2020 by EASA and the European Commission, also remains in place. This recommendation states that overflights of Iran at all levels should be avoided until further notice, as a precautionary measure.
This recommendation was issued to EU National Aviation Authorities in response to Iran’s admission that it had accidentally shot down flight PS752. This recommendation does not have the more formal status or fixed time limitation of a Conflict Zone Information Bulletin and may, therefore, be adjusted quickly, as appropriate, in response to any new information as it becomes available. EASA says it continues to monitor the situation closely.
FAA extends allowed operations in Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman airspace
The U.S. FAA has extended the allowed operations in Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman airspace, following a flight ban issued on January 8 and updated on January 10.
The ban over the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman airspace does not apply to operations conducted into and out of the countries Bahrain (and Qatar) and the U.A.E. airports, Abu Dhabi (OMAA/OMAM), Dubai (OMDB), Sharjah (OMSJ), and (newly added to the list) Al Bateen (OMAD), Al Ain (OMAL), Dalma Island (OMDL), Dubai Al Maktoum (OMDW), Fujairah (OMFJ), Ras Al-Khaimah (OMRK), And Sir Bani Yas (OMBY). As long as these flights remain within the Bahrain (OBBB), Emirates (OMAE), and Muscat (OOMM) Flight Information Regions (FIRs).
Operators must be on a published instrument procedure or under the direction of air traffic control, minimize overwater operations to the maximum extent possible, and are prohibited from entering the Tehran FIR (OIIX). For operations in the Muscat FIR (OOMM), flight operations may be conducted overwater south of M628. use of M628 in overwater areas in the Muscat FIR (OOMM) is not authorized.
More information:
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- Notam KICZ A0010/20 (PDF)
