Thai AirAsia X passed the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA).
Thai AirAsia X is a Thai long-haul low-fare airline. Its main base is Bangkok-Don Mueang International Airport. It started operating flights in 2014 and currently uses eight Airbus A330-343 aircraft.
The airline is a joint venture of AirAsia X from Malaysia and Thai AirAsia.
The IOSA programme is an evaluation system designed to assess the operational management and control systems of an airline. IOSA uses internationally recognised quality audit principles and is designed to conduct audits in a standardised and consistent manner. It was created in 2003 by IATA. All IATA members are IOSA registered and must remain registered to maintain IATA membership.
Qazaq Air passed the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA).
Qazaq Air is a Kazakh airline, based at Almaty International Airport. It started operating flights in 2015 and currently uses 3 DHC-8-Q400 aircraft on domestic flights.
The IOSA programme is an evaluation system designed to assess the operational management and control systems of an airline. IOSA uses internationally recognised quality audit principles and is designed to conduct audits in a standardised and consistent manner. It was created in 2003 by IATA. All IATA members are IOSA registered and must remain registered to maintain IATA membership.
Airbus A319 that lost fan cowl doors on takeoff (AAIB)
On November 30, 2018, an Airbus A320-214 operated by Frontier Airlines lost the fan cowl doors of engine no.2 upon takeoff from Las Vegas-McCarran International Airport, Nevada, USA. This incident was at least the 45th fan cowl door loss event involving an Airbus A320-family aircraft.
In July 2015 the U.K. AAIB published an investigation report into a fan cowl door loss accident involving an Airbus A319. Prior to this May 2013 accident , there were a total of 34 previous occurrences of fan cowl door loss on Airbus A320-family aircraft, including 21 events for aircraft fitted with IAE V2500 engines and 13 events for aircraft fitted with CFM-56 engines. Following the A319 accident, three further instances of fan cowl door losses occurred, bringing the total number of occurrences to 38.
ASN was able to trace 29 occurrences, of which seven after the publication of the AAIB report, bringing the total to at least 45 occurrences.
A common safety issue among these incidents is the fact that the cowl doors were not closed and latched following maintenance. This was not detected by the engineers, nor by flight crew members during the walk-around check. The design of the fan cowl door latching system, in which the latches are positioned at the bottom of the engine nacelle in close proximity to the ground, increased the probability that unfastened latches would not be seen during the pre-departure inspections.
Timeline of occurrences and regulatory actions:
1992
9 February 1992; A320-231 of Mexicana at Mexico City, Mexico
11 October 2000: Transport Canada issues Service Difficulty Alert AL 2000-06: “Engine Fan Cowl Loss”
31 October 2000: DGAC France issues AD 2000-444-156(B), mandating fan cowl door latch improvements.
2001
5 September 2001: DGAC France issues AD 2001-381(B), superseding AD 2000-444-156(B), and requiring the installation of additional fan cowl latch improvement by installing a hold open device.
2002
no occurrences known to ASN
2003
29 October 2003, FAA issued AD 2003-18-06, requiring that the door latches for engine fan cowls on certain Airbus airplanes be modified and that a new hold-open device be installed; all operators were required to comply by April 2005.
9 January 2008; A319-114 of Northwest Airlines at Detroit, USA
6 May 2008; A319-132 of Spirit Airlines at Detroit, USA
10 October 2008: NTSB issues safety recommendationsA-08-79 through -82 on engine fan cowl separation prevention
2009
20 August 2009: FAA issues Notice 8900.91
FAA issues Notice 8900.91 to its safety inspectors to educate operators about revising their maintenance program
2 August 2011: FAA recognizes, after additional research that fan cowl latching issues are found predominantly with A319 and CRJ200 aircraft and “found no records indicating engine-fan cowl separation incidents due to improper latching since August 2008
28 October 2011: NTSB closes recommendations A-08-79 through -82; three as ‘Unacceptable Action’, one as ‘Acceptable Action’
14 March 2016: EASA publishes AD 2016-0053; which supersedes DGAC AD 2001-381(B), and requires modification and re-identification of fan cowl doors (FCDs) on IAE engined A320-family aircraft.
13 June 2016; A320-232 of American Airlines at Phoenix Sky Harbor, USA
29 June 2017: FAA issues AD AD 2017-13-10, superseding AD 2003-18-06; requiring modifying the engine fan cowl doors (FCDs), installing placards, and re-identifying the FCDs. The AD also adds airplanes to the applicability.
25 July 2017; A320-232 of Bangkok Airways at Bangkok, Thailand
2018
7 March 2018; FAA issues AD 2018-05-04, requiring modification and re-identification, or replacement, of certain FCDs and installation of a placard. Applicable to CFM56 engined aircraft (A319/A320/A321 series -x1x); Compliance within 35 months
8 August 2018; FAA issues AD 2018-16-03, requiring modification and re-identification, or replacement, of certain FCDs and installation of a placard in the flight deck of A319-133 and A321-232 airplanes (IAE engines).
30 November 2018; A320-214 of Frontier Airlines at Las Vegas, USA
A talk on the issue by Dr K I Kourousis of the University of Limerick in this YouTube video:
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The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) extended a security warning for the Egypt Sinai Peninsula to 27 May 2019 due to continuing concern for flight safety.
The initial EASA bulletin for Egypt was issued on November 13, 2014, and the initial version of the current bulletin CZIB-2017-09 was issued on November 27, 2017.
In the meantime, new or updated Notams have been issued by the United Kingdom, USA, Germany, and Egypt.
Most governments advise operators to avoid flying below FL250 or FL260 in this area. The Egypt Notam does not contain such a warning, but does state there may be GPS jamming around Cairo International Airport. RNAV (GNSS) approaches should not be planned at Cairo Airport
The Russian Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya) has imposed restrictions on international flights of Yakutia Airlines over safety issues.
The reason for the introduction of the restriction was the violations identified during recent inspections, including incorrect information about the implementation of the airworthiness directives on the Boeing 737-800 aircraft and its further operation without maintenance; and failure to eliminate in time the malfunctions identified on the aircraft.
The agency states that the maintenance issues have caused long and numerous delays on international and domestic routes.
From November 5, the company is prohibited from flying on international airlines and will remain in force until the elimination of all identified deficiencies.
The air fleet of Yakutia Airlines consists of 5 Boeing 737-800’s, 6 Antonov An-24RV’s, 3 DHC-8-311’s and 4 Sukhoi Superjets.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released Watchlist 2018, identifying key issues requiring government and industry’s attention to make Canada’s transportation system safer in the air, marine and rail sectors.
This year, one aviation item was removed from the Watchlist due to actions taken by stakeholders and/or progress achieved in reducing the underlying safety deficiencies: the issue of unstable approaches that are continued to a landing at Canadian airports.
Still on the list are the following aviation-related items:
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) updated and extended the validity of its Conflict Zone Information Bulletins for South Sudan to 26 April 2019.
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) extended the prohibition on flight operations in the Simferopol (UKFV) and Dnipropetrovsk (UKDV) FIRs in Ukraine, but reduced the area of impacted airspace.
The FAA initially banned all U.S. flights from the Simferopol and Dnipropetrovsk areas on July 18, 2014, the day after Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot down near Hrabove, Ukraine. The FAA continued to evaluate the situation in the area and in 2016 determined there was a continuing significant flight safety hazard to U.S. civil aviation. This lead to an extended flight ban.
Since the 2016 final rule, the FAA assessed that security and safety conditions have sufficiently stabilized in certain regions of Ukraine, thereby reducing the area of impacted airspace in specified areas of the Simferopol FIR (UKFV) and Dnipropetrovsk FIR (UKDV). The FAA thus revised the flight prohibition to allow U.S. civil flights to resume in certain areas. However, the FAA finds an extension of the prohibition is necessary in other specified areas of Ukraine to safeguard against continuing hazards to civil aviation.
On October 18, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) extended the validity of Conflict Zone Information Bulletin CZIB 2017-03R3 to 18 April 2019.
The risk is described as:
Due to the hazardous security situation, with the presence of terrorist organisations and ongoing high intensity military operations, there is a risk of both intentional targeting and misidentification of civil aircraft. The presence of a wide range of ground-to-ground and dedicated anti-aviation weaponry poses a HIGH risk to operations at all flight altitudes.
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