The Indian AAIB pubished their investigation report into the serious airprox incident near Mumbai Airport, India in January 2014.
A Partenavia P68C twin turboprop aircraft took-off from runway 26 at Juhu Aerodrome at 04:29 UTC, bound for Pune, India. The pilot was the sole occupant. About the same time an Air India Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft took off from runway 14 at Mumbai Airport, for Delhi with 236 occupants.
Shortly after takeoff the Partenavia aircraft contacted Mumbai Approach Control. The aircraft was given climb instructions to 3000 feet and was asked to proceed direct to the DOGAP waypoint. This clearance was cutting across the take-off path of Mumbai’s active runway 14 at a distance of approximately 4.5 NM. The Air India flight crew contacted Mumbai Approach Control after take-off from runway 14 while passing 2100 feet at 04:35 UTC. At that time, the Partenavia was almost crossing the take-off path of runway 14. This prompted the approach controller to expeditiously climb the Partenavia to FL70. At 04:36:20 UTC the approach controller gave the Air India flight a left heading of 360 which was later amended to left heading 340 to avoid traffic.
Subsequently, at 04:36:40 the approach controller restricted the Partenavia to maintain 4000ft and turn left heading 180 and asked the Dreamliner flight to climb to FL140 and expedite passing FL80. At 04:37:03 the close proximity of both the aircraft generated a TCAS Resolution Adivsory (RA) on the Boeing 787. The crew then made an evasive maneuver. At 04:37:21 both aircraft were clear of each other and proceeded to their respective destinations.
Probable cause of the airprox incident:
The Controller giving routing to aircraft VT-TLE direct to DOGAP which was cutting across the take-off path of the aircraft VT-ANE (AIC116D), took the aircraft VT-TLE into conflict with aircraft VT-ANE and subsequently resulted into the incident.
a) The Approach controller did not stop departure from Runway 14 even after giving VT-TLE direct to DOGAP which was taking her to the takeoff path of Runway 14.
b) No attempt was made to ensure vertical separation between VT-TLE and VT-ANE until both of them came close to each other resulting into breach of separation.
c) The first avoidance headings were issued by RADAR controller to VT-ANE 60 seconds after & to VT-TLE 70 seconds after, VT-ANE first made contact with RADAR Controller. This was just 30 seconds before VT-ANE received RA.
d) Further, the ATC Automation System did not annunciate any Predicted Conflict Warning (PCW). A timely warning may have alerted the controller earlier to the impending situation for him to take a more timely action.