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Premier 1 jet crash in Thomson, Georgia caused by pilot’s failure to follow procedures during landing
27 October 2014
Flight deck of the Premier 1 (NTSB)

Flight deck of the Premier 1 (NTSB)

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the pilot in a 2013 Premier IA business airplane crash in Thomson, Georgia, failed to adhere to the airplane’s flight manual procedures for antiskid failure in flight and did not retract the lift dump immediately after making the decision to perform a go-around. Further, the pilot lacked adequate system knowledge for the airplane he was flying.

On February 20, 2013, a Premier IA, returning from a business flight, touched down at Thomson-McDuffie County Airport. The aircraft did not slow as the pilot expected and, about seven seconds later, the pilot initiated a go-around. About nine more seconds passed before the aircraft collided with a utility pole about 1,835 feet from the departure end of the runway, 63 feet above the ground. Both the pilot and copilot sustained serious injuries and all five passengers were killed.
The NTSB noted that the pilot’s fatigue, due to acute sleep loss, and his ineffective use of time between flights to obtain sleep, contributed to the accident.

On approach to the airport, after the landing gear was lowered, the antiskid fail light illuminated. The copilot commented on the illumination; however, the pilot continued the approach without responding or taking any action. Furthermore, the pilot did not refer to the checklist, which addresses antiskid failure and provides specific landing distance values.

According to the checklist for an antiskid system failure, the flap configurations available for the pilot were flaps up or flaps 10. Either of these configurations would have required a longer landing distance than the runway at Thomson-McDuffie Country Airport provided. As a result, the pilot should have sought landing at an alternate airport.

The NTSB’s investigation revealed that data from the enhanced ground proximity warning system recorded that the aircraft was configured at flaps 30, which is prohibited by the antiskid failure procedures. At the time of impact, the flaps were transitioning through flaps 15. Additionally, while both the airplane’s flight manual and a placard in the cockpit warned against extending the lift dump in flight, the go-around was attempted with the lift dump deployed, making a safe climb unlikely.

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