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EASA proposes new harmonised rules to avoid flight crew fatigue
2 October 2012

FAA approves Boeing 787 battery system design changes

B787 JA829JA at Boston Airport during the battery fire incident (photo: NTSB)

B787 JA829JA at Boston Airport during the battery fire incident (photo: NTSB)

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has approved Boeing’s design for modifications to the Boeing 787 battery system. The changes are designed to address risks at the battery cell level, the battery level and the aircraft level.

Next week, the FAA will issue instructions to operators for making changes to the aircraft and will publish the final directive that will allow the 787 to return to service with the battery system modifications. The directive will take effect upon publication. The FAA will require airlines that operate the 787 to install containment and venting systems for the main and auxiliary system batteries, and to replace the batteries and their chargers with modified components.

To assure proper installation of the new design, the FAA will closely monitor modifications of the aircraft in the U.S. fleet. The FAA will stage teams of inspectors at the modification locations. Any return to service of the modified 787 will only take place after the FAA accepts the work.

As the certifying authority, the FAA will continue to support other authorities around the world as they finalize their own acceptance procedures.

Meanwhile the NTSB is continuing its investigation into the January 7 Boeing 787 battery fire at Boston, MA, one of the incidents that led to the grounding of the 787. A public hearing will be held on April 23-24.

More information:

 

Aviation Safety Network helps identify wreckage of missing Antonov in Congo

Tail gun turret and compartment of the An-12 (photo: Terese Hart)

Tail gun turret and compartment of the An-12 (photo: Terese Hart)

The wreckage of an Antonov 12 cargo plane, missing since September 2007, has probably been found in a central Congolese forest.  The wreckage was identified in a joint effort between the TL2 Project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Aviation Safety Network.

In November 2012 parts of wreckage of an unknown Antonov 12 were found by a a team of the TL2 Project, a team led Dr. Terese Hart for exploration, conservation and discovery of a part of a central Congolese tropical forest. She published an account of the expedition to the accident site on the project’s website on February 24.

Based on photos of parts of the wreckage, the Aviation Safety Network identified the plane as an Antonov 12 due to the characteristic (former) tail gun turret and compartment . Dr. Hart told ASN that a resident of a very small village on the Lomami River remembered a plane flying low over the river in 2007, heading off in the general site of the crash. Low flying planes are extremely rare over this remote part of the forest as the nearest airports are Kisangani to the north and Kindu to the south.

The presumed flight route from Kisangani to Goma with the wreckage location(red pin).

The presumed flight route from Kisangani to Goma with the wreckage location(red pin).

ASN data shows there have been several An-12 accidents in D.R. Congo. However, all the accidents sites have been located. With the assistance of Dmitriy Yertsov an airplane was traced that was reported missing in September 2007.

An Antonov 12BK cargo plane, registered 9Q-CZB, was reported missing on September 29, 2007 after takeoff from Kisangani-Bangoka International Airport (FKI), D.R. Congo. There were five Russian and two Congolese crew members on board. The airplane was leased by the Business and Cargo Company to transport cargo to Goma Airport (GOM), also in D.R. Congo. The airplane never arrived at Goma. Unconfirmed reports later suggested  the airplane was seen operating from Khartoum, Sudan.

It seems highly likely that the wreckage is that of 9Q-CZB. This airplane had the same tail part, containing a former (closed) gun turret as well as blue colored propeller blades and blue and white paint scheme. If this is correct, it would indicate that the airplane was either heading towards Kindu, or got lost over the forest as the accident location is off the direct route from Kisangani to Goma.

Dr. Hart reported that a ‘yellow sphere’ was discovered. ‘Inside was an odd little box, with a magnetic tape head and two spools wound with ultrafine metal wire.’  This description fits the shape and contents of one of the An-12′s flight recorders. The ’yellow sphere’ was recovered from the wreckage by the search party.

the airplane

The missing An-12, 9Q-CZB, was delivered to the Soviet Air Force in 1970. In 1985 it was registered CCCP-98103 for the Voronezh Production Factory of the Soviet Ministry of General Machine Building. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the aircraft was re-registered RA-98103 in Russia and began to operate for KNG Transavia. In 2000 the airplane was registered in Equatorial Guinea as 3C-AAL, still owned by KNG Transavia.

Although still operational in Africa, the airplane was considered unairworthy by the manufacturer, Antonov as of 25 May 2005. In July 2007 the aircraft was registered in D.R. Congo as 9Q-CZB.

3C-AAL AN-12BP Groupe Rubuye

3C-AAL AN-12BP Groupe Rubuye by ChrisChen76, on Flickr

conclusion

There is no conclusive evidence that the wreckage found in Congo is that of 9Q-CZB. There is however compelling evidence that it is. All parties concerned are willing to cooperate in further investigations. For starters the Russian Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) has been notified.

 

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NTSB identifies origin of JAL Boeing 787 battery fire

B787 JA829JA at Boston Airport during the battery fire incident (photo: NTSB)

B787 JA829JA at Boston Airport during the battery fire incident (photo: NTSB)

The U.S NTSB announced that they have identified the origin of the Jan. 7 battery fire that occurred on a Japan Airlines Boeing 787 parked at Boston-Logan Airport. The focus of the investigation will now be on the design and certification requirements of the battery system.

After an exhaustive examination of the JAL lithium-ion battery, which was comprised of eight individual cells, investigators determined that the majority of evidence from the flight data recorder and both thermal and mechanical damage pointed to an initiating event in a single cell. That cell showed multiple signs of short circuiting, leading to a thermal runaway condition, which then cascaded to other cells. Charred battery components indicated that the temperature inside the battery case exceeded 500° Fahrenheit (260° C).

As investigators work to find the cause of the initiating short circuit, they ruled out both mechanical impact damage to the battery and external short circuiting. It was determined that signs of deformation and electrical arcing on the battery case occurred as a result of the battery malfunction and were not related to its cause.

Potential causes of the initiating short circuit currently being evaluated include battery charging, the design and construction of the battery, and the possibility of defects introduced during the manufacturing process.

During the 787 certification process, Boeing studied possible failures that could occur within the battery. Those assessments included the likelihood of particular types of failures occurring, as well as the effects they could have on the battery. In tests to validate these assessments, Boeing found no evidence of cell-to-cell propagation or fire, both of which occurred in the JAL event.

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Audit: FAA needs to give more assistance to smaller carriers for meeting new safety standards

The Office of Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation issued a report on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) progress and challenges in implementing the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010.

A key element of the act is raising standards in pilot training and performance, as well as advancing voluntary programs that yield critical safety information.

In an audit the OIG found that FAA has made considerable progress implementing many elements of the Act, such as advancing voluntary safety programs, improving pilot rest requirements, and establishing better processes for managing safety risks.
But the OIG also found that the FAA has not sufficiently targeted assistance to smaller air carriers who are furthest behind in developing new safety programs. In addition, FAA faces challenges with meeting timelines for key rulemaking efforts and with developing a long-term strategy for transitioning to a new pilot records database.

Five recommendations were issued to the FAA:

  1. Fully implement the Act-required ASAP and FOQA plan that assists smaller carriers in developing these safety programs.
  2. Determine how many Part 121 pilots currently do not meet the heightened qualification standards required by the Act, and assess the data for the potential impact on FAA and air carrier operations.
  3. Develop and communicate with key stakeholders the status of majormilestones, including the proposed rule, to improve timeliness and accountability for implementing the new Pilot Records Database.
  4. Require inspectors to determine if air carriers have modified policies, in accordance with the Act, to retain pilot records for the new, centralized electronic pilot records database.
  5. In developing the Pilot Records Database, require training records for all unsatisfactory pilot evaluation events to include written comments from the examiner to aid in identifying specific performance deficiencies.

 

More information:

 

Italian court: Missile caused 1980 Ustica plane crash

19800627-0-C-d-1-500

A fatal plane crash in Italy in 1980 was caused by a missile, and the State must pay damages to the families of all 81 victims for not guaranteeing the safety of the skies, Italy’s supreme Court of Cassation ruled in civil proceedings.

On June 27, 1980 an Itavia Douglas DC-9-15 jetliner was en route from Bologna to Palermo, Italy when it crashed into the Tyrrhenian Sea off Ustica. All 81 passengers and crew were killed. The airplane was flying at an altitude of FL240 when a rupture in the fuselage caused the plane to break up. Most of the wreckage sank to a depth of some 3500 metres.

The cause of the accident has never been officially established. In the years following the accident many theories were suggested. Some theories centered around the fact that the DC-9 may have accidently been shot down by NATO fighters. Either during an exercise involving Italian, U.S., and French jet fighters, or during a dog fight involving Libyan, U.S., French and Italian Air Force fighters in the area.
It has also been suggested that explosive device detonated in the rear (starboard) toilet.

The supreme Court of Cassation upheld a Palermo appeals ruling that Italian radar systems didn’t adequately protect the skies and that there was “abundantly” clear evidence that a stray missile caused the crash.

An investigation by an international Technical Commission, under the Tribunale di Roma, was established in September 1990. The Commission concluded that “the accident was brought about by in-flight break-up resulting from extensive structural damage caused by the detonation of an explosive charge in the rear (starboard) toilet.” No evidence was found in the wreckage of a missile penetrating the aircraft, nor any evidence was found which suggested an explosion of a missile near the aircraft.

More information:

 

Altimeter problems caused fatal Antonov 72 CFIT accident in Kazakhstan

The Kazakhstan Border Guards An-72 (photo © Christian Gerlach)

The Kazakhstan Border Guards An-72 (photo © Christian Gerlach)

Altimeter problems caused a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accident involving an Antonov 72 in Kazakhstan last year, according to the preliminary findings reported by the Prosecutor General’s office of Republic of Kazakhstan.

On December 25, 2012 an Antonov 72 transport plane, operated by the Kazakhstan Border Guards, crashed some 20 km from Shymkent Airport (CIT), Kazakhstan. All 20 passengers and seven crew members were killed. Among those killed was acting director of National Security Committee’s Border Guard Service, Colonel Turganbek Stambekov.

The airplane took off from Astana Airport (TSE) at 16:52 with destination Shymkent Airport (CIT). Shortly after takeoff the autopilot failed. The captain then decided to fly the plane manually. Two minutes and 40 seconds after takeoff the radio altimeter also failed. The flight was continued using barometric altimeters. Nineteen minutes into the flight there was a momentary failure of these altimeters as well, with the altitude dropping from 696 to -1375 metres. Three minutes later the alimeter again suffered a momentary spike, this time from 749 m to 2672 m.
En route and during the descent towards Shymkent the flight encountered poor weather with heavy snowfall and limited visibility. During the approach to Shymkent, the captain failed to set the correct pressure for the barometric altimeters. The altitude indicate was therefor off by about 385 metres. The airplane struck the slope of a ravine 21 km short of the runway and broke up.


reconstruction of the final flight path

ANA, JAL ground their Boeing 787 Dreamliners after emergency landing

NTSB photo of the burned auxiliary power unit battery from a JAL Boeing 787 that caught fire on Jan. 7 at Boston

NTSB photo of the burned auxiliary power unit battery from a JAL Boeing 787 that caught fire on Jan. 7 at Boston

An emergency landing of a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner at Takamatsu Airport in Japan, the latest in a string of incidents, prompted Japan Airlines (JAL) and ANA to ground their 787′s pending safety checks.

On January 16, 2012, an All Nippon Airways Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner carried out an emergency landing at Takamatsu Airport (TAK/RJOT), Japan following instrument indications of smoke in the forward electrical compartment.  ANA flight 692 took off from Yamaguchi-Ube Airport (UBJ/RJDC) at 08:10, bound for Tokyo-Haneda Airport (HND/RJTT).  The smoke warning forced the crew to divert to Takamatsu Airport (TAK/RJOT) for an emergency landing.
The airplane stopped on the runway and an emergency evacuation was carried out. One passenger was injured in the evacuation. Fire services were standing by but they did not notice any fire.

This incident was the latest in a string of mishaps involving Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner aircraft. Both JAL and ANA have decided to ground their 787 fleet pending safety checks.

Meanwhile, the NTSB is continuing their investigation into a January 7 incident at Boston involving an auxiliary power unit battery fire on a Japan Airlines 787.

More information:

 

European Commission proposes new rules for safety occurrence reporting

LOGO CE_Vertical_EN_quadriThe European Commission proposed new rules for safety occurrence reporting in Europe, aiming to achieve a decreased number of aircraft accidents and fatalities through better use of data on occurrences. 

An occurrence is any type of event significant in the context of aviation safety which might or might not have resulted in an actual accident but which merits being collected and analysed. In addition, the new rules would promote more efficient exchange of information between Member States.

Achieving the goal of preventing aircraft accidents in a proactive and risk-based safety system requires some knowhow and the means to use it. Firstly, it means getting a complete picture of the risks involved and a good understanding of the threats to aviation safety. Secondly, it means establishing mechanisms to correct deficiencies and address potential dangers. However, currently these two elements are not sufficiently tackled by the EU Member States. In addition, access to information is limited as the data collected is not sufficiently shared among the Member States.

To make up for the shortcomings of the current system, the Commission proposes in the new regulation to:

  • Ensure full awareness of actual and potential risks in aviation safety by improving the collection of safety occurrences. The new rules aim to establish a system where people feel confident in reporting information;
  • Ensure that the information collected is analysed and that actions necessary for maintaining or enhancing the level of aviation safety are taken and their effectiveness monitored;
  • Ensure that the information collected is appropriately shared among Member States and that it is used only for the purpose of improving safety.

The proposal will be discussed and amended by the European Parliament and the Council (Member States). Once they agree on a text, it will become European legislation and be directly applicable in all Member States as national law.

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Jet blast damages arrival hall, 12 cars at Lagos Airport, Nigeria

The jet blast of an Avient Cargo airplane caused damage to the Lagos Airport on December 19, 2012, PANA Press reports.

Jet blast from the engines blew off part of the roof of the arrival hall at Lagos-Murtala Mohammed International Airport in Nigeria. Debris damaged twelve cars parked nearby.

It is not yet known which aircraft was involved in the mishap. Avient operates several types of cargo aircraft, ranging from MD-11F and Ilyushin 76 to Boeing 737.

An Avient statement said: “Crew have provided a report to the airport and the matter is under investigation.”

 

EASA proposes new harmonised rules to avoid flight crew fatigue

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) published its proposal to amend the current EU rules on flight and duty time limitations and rest requirements (FTL) for commercial air transport.

Released in a final proposal known as an Opinion, the proposed rules contain more than 30 safety improvements compared to current requirements and introduce new limitations to the way crews can be scheduled.

The Opinion takes full account of the fact that fatigue is one of the main factors affecting human performance and makes no provision for increased pilot flight hours. On the contrary, allowed duty periods at night are reduced, rest for flights with time zone crossings is significantly increased, and new rules are introduced for limiting crew standby.

These FTL rules are the final step in a fully transparent rulemaking process, with unprecedented scientific input and public consultation. More than 50 scientific studies were analysed, while all concerned stakeholder groups including flight and cabin crew organisations, airlines, and Member State representatives were consulted throughout the process.

The Opinion will enter the legislative process. It will be finalised by the European Commission and must be approved by Member States, with Parliamentary scrutiny. The new rules are expected to be adopted into EU law after mid-2013 and fully implemented by the end of 2015.

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