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EASA issues Emergency AD on ATR-72 flight controls
1 April 2010

Dassault Falcon 7X flight suspension partly lifted

A Dassault-owned Falcon 7X arrives at Rotterdam Airport (EHRD) on the day following the lifting of the ban (Photo: Harro Ranter, 17 June 2011)

On May 26, 2011 all flights involving Dassault Falcon 7X jets were prohibited following the EASA’s  issuance of  emergency AD 2011-0102-E. This suspension is now lifted for certain aircraft as of June 16, 2011.

The suspension of flight operations was considered to be an interim measure pending the outcome of an investigation into a serious incident involving an uncontrolled pitch trim runaway during descent.

The initial results of the investigations are showing that there was a production defect in the Horizontal Stabilizer Electronic Control Unit (HSECU) which could have contributed to the cause of the event.  One specific HSECU is potentially affected by this production defect. Investigations are continuing to confirm this cause.

In the meantime, to allow re-starting flight operations and providing protection against further pitch trim runaway events, Dassault Aviation have developed two modifications which are implemented through accomplishment of Dassault Service Bulletin (SB) F7X-211. In addition, it has determined that the flight envelope must be restricted, compared to the original certified flight envelope.

For aeroplanes equipped with HSECU P/N 051244-02, this AD, which supersedes EASA AD 2011-0102-E, requires:

  1. accomplishment of two Dassault Aviation modifications,
  2. amending the AFM and installing a placard in the cockpit,
  3. amending the Minimum Equipment List (MEL), and
  4. implementing an operational test of the HSTA electric motors reversion relays.

For aeroplanes equipped with HSECU P/N 051244-04, the prohibition of flights is maintained.

Download PDF: EASA EAD 2011-0114-E

EASA grounds all Dassault Falcon 7X aircraft pending incident investigation

A Falcon 7X jet (photo: Jerome K. /CC: by-nc-nd)

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD), prohibiting flight operations of Dassault Falcon 7X jets.

The AD is considered to be an interim measure pending the outcome of an investigation into a serious incident currently carried out by the manufacturer. Further AD action is expected to follow when additional information is available.

The incident involved a Falcon 7X which experienced an uncontrolled pitch trim runaway during descent. The crew succeeded in recovering a stable situation and performed an uneventful landing. Analysis of the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) and Fault History Database (FHDB) confirmed the event, but did not allow explaining the origin of the pitch trim runaway.

This condition, if occurring again, could lead to loss of control of the aeroplane. To address this potential unsafe condition, Dassault Aviation has proposed to EASA to prohibit, from the effective date of this AD, any flight operations of Falcon 7X aeroplanes, to which EASA agreed by issuing this AD.

FAA will mandate inspections for early models of 737 aircraft

The U.S. FAA issues an emergency directive that will require operators of specific early Boeing 737 models to conduct initial and repetitive electromagnetic inspections for fatigue damage. This action will initially apply to a total of approximately 175 aircraft worldwide, 80 of which are U.S.-registered aircraft. Most of the aircraft in the U.S. are operated by Southwest Airlines.

The FAA airworthiness directive will require initial inspections using electromagnetic, or eddy-current, technology in specific areas of the aircraft fuselage on certain Boeing 737 aircraft in the -300, -400 and -500 series that have accumulated more than 30,000 flight cycles. It will then require repetitive inspections at regular intervals.

In  November 2010, the FAA published a rule designed specifically to address widespread fatigue damage in aging aircraft. The rule requires aircraft manufacturers to establish a number of flight cycles or hours a plane can operate and be free from fatigue damage. The rule requires aircraft manufacturers to incorporate the limits into their maintenance programs.

Emergency AD: Falcon 50 fire extinguishing system inspection

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued an emergency airworthiness directive, requiring inspection of the fire extinguishing system of Dassault Falcon 50 and Falcon 50EX aircraft.

On two occurrences on Falcon 50 aeroplanes in service, it was detected that two pipes had been swapped in maintenance at the frame 42 firewall. The swapped lines are the extinguishing system line to engine # 2,and engine # 2 Low Pressure (LP) bleed line.

If the swapping of these two lines is not detected and corrected, in case of engine # 2 fire, the fire extinguishing capability would not be operational.

For this reason, the AD requires an inspection of the connection of the two lines (extinguishing and LP bleed lines) at frame 42 in the rear compartment and, in case of findings, proper re-installation of the lines. This AD requires as well reporting to Dassault Aviation. This AD is considered to be an interim measure and, depending on the inspection results provided by operators, further AD action may follow.

 

EASA amends emergency AD on Trent engines

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a new  emergency airworthiness directive (2010-0242-E) for Rolls Royce RB211 Trent 900 series engines following a recent incident involving  such an engine on a Qantas A380.  This AD supersedes a previous emergency AD ( 2010-0236-E) that was issued on Novemer 10, 2010.

Since issuance of AD 2010-0236-E, the incident investigation has progressed and inspection data from in-service engines has been gathered and analysed.
The results of this analysis show the need to amend the inspection procedure, retaining the inspection of the air buffer cavity and focusing on the oil servicetubes within the HP/IP structure.

This AD partially retains the requirements of AD 2010-0236-E, which is superseded, and requires implementation of the amended procedure and accomplishment of the associated inspections.

 

EASA issues emergency AD for Airbus A300-600 pitch uncoupling unit inspections

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued an emergergency airworthiness directive (EASA EAD 2010-0239-E)  mandating an inspection of Airbus A300-600 pitch uncoupling units.

During a routine maintenance check on an A300-600 aeroplane, the operator found the pitch uncoupling unit installed at an incorrect location.
The pitch uncoupling unit was inverted with the rod assembly.

After a complete inspection of all A300-600 aeroplanes of its fleet, the operator identified the same incorrect installation on another aeroplane.

Had this routine maintenance check, which was accomplished for other purposes, not been carried out, the incorrect installation could only have been detected during the accomplishment of the pitch uncoupling functional test.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, in combination with particular failure modes, could lead to loss of control of the aeroplane during the takeoff phase.

For this reason, the AD requires a one time visual inspection, to detect any incorrect installation of the pitch uncoupling unit, and, depending on findings, to take corrective actions.

The AD applies to A300-600 aeroplanes, all certified models, all serial numbers, and A300F4-608ST aeroplanes, all serial numbers, except aeroplanes on which the pitch uncoupling functional test has already been performed in service since new.

 

EASA issues emergency AD on Trent engines following Qantas A380 engine failure

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) for Rolls Royce RB211 Trent 900 series engines following a recent incident involving  such an engine on a Qantas A380.

The incident happened on November 4, 2010 when engine nr 2. on a Qantas Airbus A380, VH-OQA, suffered an uncontained failure shortly after takeoff from Singapore.

Analysis of the preliminary elements from the incident investigation shows that an oil fire in the HP/IP structure cavity may have caused the failure of the Intermediate Pressure Turbine (IPT) Disc.

This condition, if not detected, could ultimately result in uncontained engine failure potentially leading to damage to the aeroplane and hazards to persons or property on the ground.

For these reasons and pending conclusion of the incident investigation, the AD requires repetitive inspections of the Low Pressure Turbine (LPT) stage 1 blades and case drain, HP/IP structure air buffer cavity and oil service tubes in order to detect any abnormal oil leakage, and if any discrepancy is found, to prohibit further engine operation.

 

Note: This emergency AD was superseded by a EAD 2010-0242-E on November 22:  http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/easa_ad_2010_0242_E.pdf

 

Transport Canada issues emergency AD on RegionalJet landing gear extension problems

Transport Canada issued an emergency airworthiness directive (EAD CF-2010-36) for several models of the Canadair / Bombardier RegionalJet following main landing gear extension problems.

Transport Canada reports two cases of main landing gear (MLG) failure to fully extend on CRJ aircraft.  Preliminary investigation has shown that interference between the MLG door and the MLG fairing seal prevented the MLG door from opening. This directive mandates the inspection and rectification, as required, of the MLG fairing and seal, MLG door, and adjacent structures.

Affected are the following models:

  • CL-600-2C10 (CRJ-700 series), serial numbers 10003 and subsequent
  • CL-600-2D15 (CRJ-705 series)
  • CL-600-2D24 (CRJ-900 series), serial number 15001 and subsequent

The AD does not specify the two occurrences, but one of those was probably an incident that occurred on September 25, 2010 involving an Atlantic Southeast Airlines CRJ-900. The airplane landed on at New York-JFK with the right MLG fully retracted.

EASA issues emergency AD on Falcon 50 emergency brake installations

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive (2010-0208-E) with regards to an inspection of emergency brake installations on Dassault Falcon 50 jets.

On two occurrences on Dassault Falcon 50 aircraft  in service, it was detected that two pipes of the emergency brake system #2 located near the nose landing gear bearing were swapped.

The swapping of these two pipes implies that when the Left Hand (LH) brake pedal is depressed, the Right Hand (RH) brake unit is activated, and conversely, when the RH brake pedal is depressed, the LH brake unit is actuated. This constitutes an unsafe condition, which may go unnoticed asthe condition is latent until the emergency brake system #2 is used. This condition, if not corrected, could ultimately lead to a runway excursion of the airplane.

The AD requires an inspection of the main landing gear braking system and, in case of findings, proper re-installation of the emergency brake system #2 pipes. It also requires painting the affected pipes for clear identification in order to avoid mistakes while reinstalling them after maintenance.

 

EASA issues Emergency AD on ATR-72 flight controls

EASA issued an emergency airworthiness directive (EAD 2010-0063-E) regarding ATR-72 flight controls.

During flight control checks prior to take-off (cockpit pre-flight preparations), abnormal motion of the rudder pedal was observed in two ATR72-212A aeroplanes, the affected pedal staying stuck on its stop end position. Subsequent inspection showed that in both cases, one of the rudder pedal rods, Part Number (P/N) S2728116400000, was broken.

Further investigation revealed that an error has occurred during the manufacturing process of the affected rods. As a result, some of the rods (which have been identified as belonging to production batch numbers CC 2109699 and
CC 2118930) may have an outer diameter which is smaller than the minimum value as specified in the original design drawings.

The rods belonging to these batches were installed in the rudder pedal assemblies of certain aeroplanes. Most of the related rods have been checked and found to be in conformity with acceptable dimensions; those that were not
have been replaced while still on the production line, prior to delivery of the affected aeroplanes. However, seven (7) aeroplanes already in service have been identified that are likely to have the affected rods installed.

This condition, if not corrected, could lead to failure of the rudder pedal rod, possibly resulting in reduced control of the aeroplane. In combination with an engine failure or during a landing or take-off under crosswind conditions, such a failure could lead to loss of control of the aeroplane.

For the reasons described above, this Emergency AD requires inspection of the four rudder pedal rods, to detect a lower than acceptable outer diameter at each rod end, and replacement of any rods that fail the inspection criteria.